

# Is there a Dark Side to Exchange Traded Funds? An Information Perspective

by

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## Abstract

We examine whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in pricing efficiency for the underlying component securities. Our tests show an increase in ETF ownership is associated with: (1) higher trading costs (bid-ask spreads and market liquidity); (2) an increase in “stock return synchronicity”; (3) a decline in “future earnings response coefficients”; and (4) a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm. Collectively, our findings support the view that increased ETF ownership can lead to higher trading costs and lower benefits from information acquisition. This combination results in less informative security prices for the underlying firms.

JEL Classifications: G11, G14, M41

Keywords: Exchange traded funds (ETFs); Uninformed and informed traders; Costly information; Trading costs; Market pricing efficiency; Informative prices.

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## I. Introduction

Traditional noisy rational expectations models with costly information feature agents who expend resources to become informed. These informed agents earn a return on their information acquisition efforts by trading with the uninformed, and as they do so, the information they possess is incorporated into prices.<sup>1</sup> In many of these models, the supply of uninformed traders adjusts to provide just sufficient reward for costly efforts in information acquisition and processing. The equilibrium between cost constraints faced by informed traders and gains from trading against the uninformed is reflected in the level of informational efficiency of security prices in the market. The inherent tension between the efficiency with which firm-specific information is incorporated into stock prices, and the incentives needed to acquire that information and disseminate it, is central to understanding the informational role of security prices (e.g., Hayek 1945, Grossman 1989).

This paper employs exchange-traded fund (ETF) ownership data to examine the economic linkages between the market for firm-specific information, the market for individual securities, and the role of uninformed traders. Specifically, we investigate whether an increase in ETF ownership is associated with a decline in the informational efficiency (or “pricing efficiency”) of the individual component securities underlying the fund.<sup>2</sup> In frictionless markets, a firm’s ownership structure should have little to do with the informational efficiency of its share price. However, as we argue below, market frictions related to information acquisition costs can cause ownership by ETFs to be a significant economic event, with direct consequences for the informational efficiency of the underlying securities.

Our central conjecture is that ETF ownership can influence a stock’s informational efficiency through its impact on the number of underlying shares available for trading to individual investors and the supply of uninformed traders willing to trade these securities. As ETF

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Verrecchia (1982), Admati (1985), and Kyle (1985, 1989).

<sup>2</sup> We use the terms “pricing efficiency” and “informational efficiency” interchangeably. Both terms refer to the speed and efficiency with which price incorporates new information. Empirically, we use several proxies to measure informational efficiency, including “price synchronicity” (*SYNCH*), “future earnings response coefficients” (*FERC*), and the number of analysts covering a firm (*ANALYST*).

ownership grows, an increasing proportion of the outstanding shares for the underlying security becomes “locked up” (held in trust) by the fund sponsor. Although these shares are available for trade as part of a basket transaction at the ETF-level, they are no longer available to traders who wish to transact on firm-specific information. Even more importantly, ETFs offer an attractive alternative investment vehicle for uninformed (or “noise”) traders who would otherwise trade the underlying component securities.<sup>3</sup> As ETF ownership increases, some uninformed traders in the underlying securities migrate toward the ETF market. Over time, this migration creates a steady siphoning of firm-level liquidity which in turn generates a disincentive for informed traders to expend resources to obtain firm-specific information.

We propose and test two hypotheses. First, we posit that as ETFs become larger holders of a firm’s shares, *transaction costs for the underlying securities will increase*. This increase in trading costs is associated with a decrease in available liquidity for the component securities owned by ETFs. Second, we posit that these increased transaction costs will lead to *a general deterioration in the pricing efficiency of the underlying securities*. Specifically, we posit that the increased transaction costs will serve as a deterrent to traders who would otherwise expend resources on information acquisition about that stock. In other words, for firms that are widely-held by ETFs, the incentive for agents to seek out, acquire, and trade on firm-specific information will decrease. Over time, this will result in a general deterioration in the firm’s information environment, and a reduction in the extent to which its stock price is able to quickly reflect firm-specific information.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Several models predict noise investors will migrate to index-like instruments because their losses to informed traders are lower in these markets than in the market for individual securities (e.g., Rubinstein 1989; Subrahmanyam 1991; Gorton and Pennacchi 1993). Empirically, we have observed such a migration from actively managed assets to passively managed ETFs in recent years. As of June 2015, total ETF trading is close to 28% of the total daily value traded on US equity exchanges (Pisani 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Note that the siphoning of liquidity from component securities can occur with other basket securities as well, such as open-end index funds. However, a key difference between ETFs and index-linked open-end funds is that ETF shares can be traded throughout the day, while transactions with open-end funds occur only at the end of the day, and only at net asset value (NAV). Thus ETFs are a more attractive instrument for uninformed traders who trade for speculative reasons, while index funds are better suited to longer term buy-and-hold investors. In section II, we explain in detail the implications of this difference for our tests.

To test these hypotheses, we conduct a series of tests using a cross-section of U.S. stocks between 2000 and 2014. Our research design makes use of panel data based on firm-year observations.<sup>5</sup> Specifically, we collect end-of-year ETF ownership data and examine the effect of *changes* in ETF ownership on the component securities': (1) trading costs, and (2) various proxies of firm-level pricing efficiency.<sup>6</sup>

In our trading cost tests, we follow prior literature (Goyenko et al. 2009, Corwin and Schultz 2012, Amihud 2002) in using two proxies of firm trading costs – the relative bid-ask spreads, *HLSPREAD*, and an adjusted measure of the price impact of trades, *ILLIQ\_N*.<sup>7</sup> After controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio, share turnover, return volatility, and overall level of institutional ownership, we find that an increase in ETF ownership is associated with an increase in average daily bid-ask spreads of the component securities, measured over the next year. In addition, we show an increase in ETF ownership is associated with lower market liquidity in the underlying security over the next year.

Our tests show a one percentage point increase in ETF ownership is associated with an increase of 1.6% in the average bid-ask spreads over the next year. At the same time, a one percentage point increase in ETF ownership is associated with an increase of 2% in average absolute returns over the next year. These findings are consistent with Hamm (2014), who reports that increased ETF ownership is associated with an increase in the “Kyle Lambda” (a stock illiquidity measure) for the underlying component securities owned by these funds.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> We use annual holding periods to test our hypotheses because we expect the information-related effects of ETF ownership changes to be experienced gradually over time. Our inferences are the same if we use quarterly panels.

<sup>6</sup>To improve our ability to identify the consequences of increased ETF ownership in a cleaner setting, we focus mainly on analyzing the associations of *lagged changes* in ETF ownership with firms' trading costs and measures of pricing efficiency.

<sup>7</sup> For reasons detailed in section III, we decompose the Amihud (2002) measure of price impact of trades and investigate the effect of increased ETF ownership on the numerator of the Amihud (2002) measure, *ILLIQ\_N*, controlling for the denominator of the Amihud (2002) measure, *ILLIQ\_D*.

<sup>8</sup> Compared to Hamm (2014), we use alternative measures of stock liquidity, include different control variables, examine annual vs. quarterly observations, and use a more complete firm-level longitudinal data set. Our main findings with respect to the effect of ETF ownership on stock liquidity are consistent with Hamm (2014). It should be noted that Hamm (2014) does not examine the implications of ETF ownership on the informational efficiency of security prices.

To test the information-related effects of ETF ownership, we examine the effect of ETF ownership on two proxies for the extent to which stock prices reflect firm-specific information: (1) stock return synchronicity, *SYNCH* (the extent to which variation in firm-level stock returns is attributable to movements in market and related-industry returns), and (2) future earnings response coefficient, *FERC* (the association between current firm-specific returns and future firm earnings). In addition, we examine whether an increase in ETF ownership is associated with a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm.<sup>9</sup>

Our results are broadly consistent with the information-related hypothesis. Specifically, we find that an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in the pricing efficiency of the underlying component securities, as measured by either *SYNCH* or *FERC*. Our results indicate that a one-percentage point increase in ETF ownership is associated with approximately a 9 percentage point increase in the average annual change in return synchronicity. Furthermore, firms experiencing a one-percentage point increase in ETF ownership also experience a 14% reduction in the magnitude of their future earnings response coefficients. These results are robust to various model perturbations, as well as the inclusion of controls for institutional ownership and a host of other variables prescribed by prior literature (Roll 1988, Durnev et al. 2003, Piotroski and Roulstone 2004, Ettredge et al. 2005, Choi et al. 2011). Finally, we also find that an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm.

It is instructive to compare and contrast our results with the findings reported in a recent working paper by Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016; hereafter, GNZ). Like us, GNZ examine the effect of ETF trading on the informational efficiency of underlying securities. However, they document an *increase* in information efficiency for firms with increased ETF trading. This evidence suggests that an increase in ETF ownership improves pricing efficiency in the underlying stock. At first blush, these findings seem at odds with ours. However, using the

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<sup>9</sup> These measures have been featured in prior literature on pricing efficiency (e.g., Roll 1988, Durnev et al. 2003, Piotroski and Roulstone 2004, Ettredge et al. 2005, Choi et al. 2011).

same filtering rules as GNZ, we are able to replicate their finding, and reconcile them with our own.

A key difference in the research design between the two studies is in the timing of the ETF trades. While we examine the effect of *past* changes in ETF ownership on *future* earning response coefficients (FERCs), GNZ's tests are focused on the effect of contemporaneous ETF trading on current quarter earnings-response-coefficients (ERCs). In other words, their study focuses the effect of *contemporaneous increases in ETF ownership* on the market's ability to incorporate *same-quarter* earnings. However, our study is focused on longer-term implications of changes in ETF ownership for the informational environment of the firms.

The research design of GNZ is motivated by price discovery theory in market microstructure. A number of studies in that literature suggest trading associated with the ETF-arbitrage mechanism can improve intraday price discovery for the underlying securities (Hasbrouck 2003, Yu 2005, Chen and Strother 2008, Fang and Sanger 2012, and Ivanov et al. 2013), particularly if the individual securities are less liquid than the ETF. The idea is that traders can respond to earnings news (especially the macro-related component of earnings) more quickly by trading the lower cost ETF instrument. As a result, the price of the ETF may lead the price of the underlying securities in integrating this type of news. Hasbrouck (2003) provide some empirical evidence for this phenomenon using index futures. GNZ's findings are consistent with this idea in that increases in ETF ownership in a given quarter are associated with higher *same-quarter* ERCs.

Applying the same data filters as GNZ, we also find a positive contemporaneous relation between increases in ETF ownership and the market's ability to incorporate same-quarter earnings. However, we go a step further and show that this positive relation holds only when all three variables (stock returns, ETF changes, and earnings) are measured in the same quarter. As we lengthen the time lag between ETF changes and future earnings, the relation turns negative. Moreover, as we increase the time lag between past ETF changes and current returns, the negative relation becomes stronger. In other words, while same-quarter ETF trading seems to

improve pricing efficiency, the more salient result over the longer run is that increases in ETF ownership lead to a deterioration in pricing efficiency for the underlying securities.

We also provide some evidence on the differential impact of changes in ETF ownership on the incorporation of “macro-based” versus “firm-specific” components of earnings news. GNZ posit that increased ETF trading can enhance price discovery for information embedded in macro-based component of firm earnings. The idea is that, for this type of earnings news, informed traders would prefer to trade through the ETF, which is a low-cost venue. To test this conjecture, GNZ parse the earnings of each firm into a macro-based component and a firm-specific component. Their results show that increases in ETF ownership primarily improve the market’s ability to integrate macro-based earnings news. In their tests, the effect of changes in ETF ownership on the association between firm-specific component of earnings and stock returns, ERC, is insignificant.

In contrast, our main hypothesis is that the cost of information arbitrage will increase with ETF ownership. While this effect should reduce firm-specific FERC, it could also reduce the macro-based FERC. This is because as ETF ownership increases, all investors (both informed and uninformed) face higher trading costs, and consequently have lower incentive to acquire and analyze information about the underlying securities. Therefore, over time, we would expect increased ETF ownership to be associated with lower FERCs on both the macro-based and firm-specific components of earnings.

Our results largely support this hypothesis. First, we replicate the GNZ result using a quarterly panel. Second, we show that in periods *following* increases in ETF ownership, the correlation between returns and future period macro-based and firm-specific components of earnings is lower. In fact, we find that the negative impact of increased ETF ownership on firms’ FERC is generally more pronounced for the firm-specific component of earnings. Taken together, our findings confirm the GNZ finding that ETF trading improves price discovery for the same-quarter macro-based component of a firm’s earnings. However, we also show this positive effect is short-lived. Over the longer term, the primary effect of increases in ETF

ownership is to lower both macro-based and firm-specific FERCs. This effect is particularly strong with respect to the firm-specific component of earnings.

These findings contribute to a growing literature on the economic consequences of basket or index-linked products. The rapid increase in index-linked products in recent years has attracted the attention of investors, regulators, and financial researchers.<sup>10</sup> A number of prior studies suggest that trading associated with the ETF-arbitrage mechanism can improve intraday price discovery for the underlying stocks (Hasbrouck 2003, Yu 2005, Chen and Strother 2008, Fang and Sanger 2012, and Ivanov et al. 2013). Other studies highlight concerns related to the pricing and trading of these instruments, including the more rapid transmission of liquidity shocks, higher return correlations among stocks held by same ETFs (Da and Shive 2013, Sullivan and Xiong 2012), greater systemic risk (Ramaswamy 2011), and elevated intraday return volatility (Ben-David et al. 2015, Broman 2013, Krause et al. 2013), particularly during times of market stress (Wurgler 2010).

Our study adds a longer-term informational perspective to this debate. Adopting key insights from information economics (Rubinstein 1989, Subrahmanyam 1991, Gorton and Pennacchi 1993, Bhattacharaya and O'Hara 2016, Cong and Xu 2016), we present empirical evidence on how incentives in the market for information can affect pricing in the market for the underlying securities. Our results suggest that ETF ownership can lead to increased trading costs for market participants, which has further consequences for the amount of firm-specific information that is incorporated into stock prices. While the benefits of ETFs to investors are well understood (Rubinstein 1989), far less is known about other (unintended) economic consequences they may bring to financial markets. Our findings help highlight a potentially undesirable consequence of ETFs.

Evidence presented in this study also provides support for a long-standing prediction of the noisy rational expectations literature. A number of models in this literature (Grossman and

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<sup>10</sup> Sullivan and Xiong (2012) note that while passively managed funds represent only about one-third of all fund assets, their average annual growth rate since the early 1990's is 26 percent, double that of actively managed assets. Much of the increase in passively managed assets has been in the form of ETFs. According to Madhavan and Sobczyk (2014) as of June, 2014 there were 5,217 global ETFs representing \$2.63 trillion in total net assets.

Stiglitz 1980, Hellwig 1980, Admati 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1981, Verrecchia 1982, and Kyle 1985, 1989) predict that when information is costly to acquire and process, informational efficiency of security prices will vary with the supply of uninformed investors willing to trade these securities. Using the emergence of ETFs, we link the siphoning of firm-level liquidity and an increase in trading costs to a reduction in the incentives for information acquisition, and hence lower pricing efficiency.

Lee and So (2015) argue that the study of market efficiency involves the analysis of a joint equilibrium in which all markets need to be cleared simultaneously. Specifically, supply must equal demand in the market for information about the underlying security, as well as in the market for the security itself. Our findings provide support for this view of market efficiency, and bring into sharp relief the close relationship between the market for component securities and the market for information about these securities.

The remainder of our study is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some institutional details on ETFs and describe the link between noise trading and ETFs. In section III, we develop our main hypotheses and outline our research design. Section IV reports the empirical findings, and section V concludes.

## **II. Exchange-Traded Funds and Noise Traders**

### **II.1 Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)**

In the United States, ETFs are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are classified as open-ended funds or as unit investment trusts (UITs). Like open-end index funds, in a typical ETF, the underlying basket of securities is defined with the objective of mimicking the performance of a broad market index. But ETFs differ in some important respects from traditional open-ended funds. For example, unlike open-ended funds, which can only be bought or sold at the end of the trading day for their net asset value (NAV), ETFs can be traded

throughout the day much like a closed-end fund.<sup>11</sup> In addition, ETFs do not sell shares directly to investors. Instead, they only issue shares in large blocks called “creation units” to authorized participants (“APs”) who effectively act as market-makers.

Only the ETF manager and designated APs participate in the primary market for the creation/redemption of ETF shares. At the inception of the ETF, APs buy an appropriate basket of the predefined securities and deliver them to the ETF manager, in exchange for a number of ETF creation units. Investors can then buy or sell individual shares of the ETF from APs in the secondary market on an exchange. Shares of the ETF trade during the day in the secondary market at prices that can deviate from their net asset value (NAV), but the difference is kept in line through an arbitrage mechanism in the primary market. For example, when an ETF is trading at a premium to an AP’s estimate of value, the AP may choose to deliver the creation basket of securities in exchange for ETF shares, which in turn it could elect to sell or keep.

Note that the creation/redemption mechanism in the ETF structure allows the number of shares outstanding in an ETF to expand or contract based on investor demand. As Madhavan and Sobczyk (2014) observe, this creation/redemption mechanism means that “liquidity can be accessed through primary market transactions in the underlying assets, beyond the visible secondary market.” This additional element of liquidity means that trading costs of ETFs are determined by the *lower bound* of execution costs in either the secondary or primary markets, a factor especially important for large investors.” (p.3). In other words, unlike open-end funds, APs interested in accessing the assets represented by the ETF can now choose to trade either in the secondary ETF market (buy/sell the ETF shares directly), or in the primary market (buy/sell the basket securities).

For other (non-APs) investors, ETFs offer the convenience of a stock (ETFs can be bought and sold throughout the day, like common stocks) along with the diversification of a mutual fund or index funds (they give investors a convenient way to purchase a broad basket in a single transaction). Unlike open-end index funds (or other basket securities), ETFs do not require

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<sup>11</sup> Specifically, unlike ETFs, open-ended do not provide a ready intraday market for deposits and redemptions with a continuous series of available transaction prices. Hence, investors may not know with sufficient certainty the cash-out value of redemption before they must commit it.

investors to deal directly with the fund itself. The most popular ETFs also tend to be much more liquid than the underlying securities, making them useful instruments for speculators and active traders.<sup>12</sup> Finally, adding to their appeal to active traders, ETF shares can also be borrowed and sold short.

In sum, ETFs possess many of the characteristics of what Rubinstein (1989) calls an “ideal market basket vehicle.” In particular, ETFs (1) have a continuous market through time of basket sales and purchases (i.e., provide reliable cash-out prices prior to commitment to trade), (2) have low creation costs (i.e., trade execution costs incurred in the original purchase of components of the underlying basket and organization costs), (3) enhance tax benefits obtained from positions in the individual components of the basket (there is no taxation of unrealized profits; unlike open-ended mutual funds, which typically fund shareholder redemptions by selling portfolio securities, ETFs usually redeem investors in-kind), (4) are offered in small enough units to appeal to small investors (not just to large institutional investors), and (5) remove all basket-motivated trading away from the individual securities or risks comprising the basket.

We posit these characteristics make ETFs attractive to noise (uninformed) traders who would otherwise trade the underlying securities. Our main conjecture is that with the rise in ETFs, some noise traders will gravitate to ETFs and away from the underlying stocks, with attendant consequences for the trading costs and pricing efficiency of the underlying securities. In the next subsection, we discuss in more detail this hypothesized link between noise trading and ETFs.

## **II.2 Noise Traders and ETFs**

Although noise (uninformed) traders play a prominent role in analytical models, surprisingly little is known about why they trade. The typical noisy rational expectations model (e.g., Kyle

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<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that ETFs are most likely to be successful when the underlying securities are relatively less liquid or difficult to borrow (thus creating an equilibrium demand for the ETF shares, with its lower trading costs). For example, the highly popular small-cap ETF, IWM, is based on the Russell 2000 index. While the underlying securities are typically less liquid (i.e., they represent the 2,000 stocks in the Russell Index that are below the largest 1,000), IWM itself is over \$26 billion in size and trades at extremely low costs.

1985, Verrecchia 1982, Admati 1985) abstracts away from this question. In these models, noisetraders trade for exogenous reasons unrelated to information. Because their motive for trading is non-informational, noise traders in this literature are also often referred to as “liquidity traders.” This moniker suggests they trade either for consumptive or for portfolio-rebalancing reasons, neither of which would necessarily change with the rise of ETFs.

Our analysis can be accommodated within a standard noisy rational expectations (NRE) framework. The key assumption needed is that the cost of becoming informed in a security is increasing with its ETF ownership. As ETF ownership increases, we assert (and our tests show) that the cost of informational arbitrage will also increase. Given increased information costs, NRE models (e.g., Verrecchia 1982, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) predict a decrease in the security’s pricing efficiency. This robust prediction of the NRE literature is the basis of our main hypothesis.<sup>13</sup> Note however, that because the NRE framework provides no motivation for noise trading, it has little to say about why noise trading might migrate to ETFs, rather than to index funds. To address this question, we need to impose additional structure on noise trading.

The noise traders we have in mind are closer to those featured in Black (1986). According to Black, noise traders engage in non-informational trades not primarily for liquidity reasons, but because they either mistakenly think they have superior information, or because they find utility from trading itself. In his words: “Noise trading is trading on noise as if it were information. People who trade on noise are willing to trade even though from an objective point of view they would be better off not trading. Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is information.

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<sup>13</sup> What happens if the cost of private information remains constant? In that case, pricing efficiency may not be affected by an exodus of uninformed traders. This result derives because two opposing forces are at work:

- a. As uninformed traders exit the market the profits from trading with them as an informed trader becomes smaller; and,
- b. As fewer informed traders purchase private signals, the value of being one of the remaining informed traders becomes larger.

The net effect is that fewer informed traders will individually make more money, with no net change in the economy-wide value of becoming informed (which remains equal to the information cost). Although the source of noise differs in Verrecchia (1982) and the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the same result obtains in both models. In both, pricing efficiency will be unaffected by an exodus of uninformed traders if information costs remain constant. We are grateful to the Editor for pointing this out to us.

Or perhaps they just like to trade.” (Black 1986; p. 531). This form of noise trading, Black argues, is needed to rationalize the high volume of trading we observe in individual stocks.

With the rise of ETFs, we posit some noise (uninformed) traders who formerly traded the underlying stocks will migrate to these basket instruments instead. They do so because ETFs still allow them to express a view on certain stocks (or stock baskets/substitutes), but at much lower costs. A key difference between ETFs and passive index funds is that ETFs allow noise traders to satisfy their desire to trade (or engage in speculation) while passive index products, by and large, do not. If Black is correct, and noise traders do not trade primarily for consumptive reasons, ETFs can offer “transactional utility” to these traders in ways that passive index funds cannot.

Recent empirical evidence suggests such a migration is indeed taking place. Sullivan and Xiong (2012) find that the average annual growth rate of passively managed assets since the early 1990’s is double that of actively managed assets. In recent years, much of this increase has been in the form of ETFs. More importantly, the total value of trading in ETFs far outstrips their share ownership. Figure 1 shows that ETF ownership averaged around 5.5% for our sample firms in recent years. However, as Pisani (2015) observed, total ETF trading is now close to 28% of the total daily value traded on US equity exchanges. In other words, the daily turnover in ETF shares is approximately five times larger than the turnover in the shares of a typical stock. These findings show ETFs are now serving as common trading vehicles, and not merely as a way to secure a passive index return.

### **III. Hypothesis development and research design**

The primary goal of this study is to investigate whether an increase in the proportion of firm shares held by ETFs is associated with a decline in the pricing efficiency of the underlying component securities. To address this question we identify two central dimensions of a firm’s information environment: (1) transactions costs of market participants, and (2) the extent to

which stock prices reflect firm-specific information. We then make predictions about the effects of ETF ownership on each of these dimensions and construct tests to evaluate these predictions.

We first posit that ETFs serve as attractive substitutes to the underlying component securities for uninformed traders. Because of the trading benefits offered by ETFs, especially to uninformed investors, we expect uninformed investors to gravitate toward ETFs and away from the underlying stocks (Milgrom and Stokey 1982, Rubinstein 1989). As uninformed traders shift toward trading ETFs and away from trading the underlying securities, transactions costs for trading the underlying component securities will increase (Subrahmanyam 1991, Gorton and Pennacchi 1993, Mahavan and Sobczyk 2014). The increase in transactions costs will deter market participants from engaging in firm-specific information gathering activities and will lead to less informative stock prices in the firm-specific component (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Admati 1985). Based on the reasoning outlined above, we raise the following hypotheses:

**H1:** An increase in ETF ownership is associated with higher trading costs for the underlying component securities.

**H2:** An increase in ETF ownership is associated with deterioration in the pricing efficiency of the underlying component securities.

To test H1, we analyze the relation between changes in ETF ownership and changes in two proxies of liquidity that capture trading costs: (1) bid-ask spreads, and (2) an adjusted measure of the price impact of trades (Goyenko et al. 2009). To investigate the relation between changes in ETF ownership and changes in bid-ask spreads, we estimate the following regression:<sup>14</sup>

$$\Delta HLSPREAD_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1}$$

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<sup>14</sup> We test our hypotheses using annual panels because we expect the effect of increased ETF ownership to manifest itself gradually over time after an increase in ETF ownership. Figure 2 presents a sample construction timeline for the key empirical variables used in our tests. Most of our analyses are done using *annual* changes in ETF ownership, returns, and earnings (Panel A). However, in our replication and reconciliation of the GNZ results, we used *quarterly* data (Panel B) to match their analyses.

$$+ \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

In Eq. (1), the  $\Delta$  operator indicates a change in the value of a particular variable. For example,  $\Delta HLSPREAD_{it}$  is the difference between firm  $i$ 's measure of  $HLSPREAD$  during year  $t$  and its value in year  $t-1$ .  $HLSPREAD_{it}$ , is the Corwin and Schultz (2012) annual high-low measure of bid-ask spread for firm  $i$  over year  $t$ . Corwin and Schultz (2012) derive this estimator from the observation that the ratio of high to low observed stock prices  $\left(\frac{H_t^o}{L_t^o}\right)$  in a particular time period is a function of the bid-ask spread ( $S$ ), which is a fixed amount, and the “true” unobservable range of high ( $H_t^A$ ) and low ( $L_t^A$ ) stock prices, which themselves are functions of the underlying variance of the stock price that varies with the time horizon:

$$\left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_t^o}{L_t^o} \right) \right]^2 = \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_t^A (1+S/2)}{L_t^A (1-S/2)} \right) \right]^2$$

This distinction makes it possible to estimate the spread by using a system of equations in which spread is constant but the time horizon (and consequently, the variance) changes. The result spread estimator ( $S$ ) is defined by the following set of expressions:

$$S = \frac{2(e^\alpha - 1)}{1 + e^\alpha}, \quad \alpha = \frac{\sqrt{2\beta} - \sqrt{\beta}}{3 - 2\sqrt{2}} - \sqrt{\frac{Y}{3 - 2\sqrt{2}}}, \quad \beta = \sum_{j=0}^1 \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_{t+j}^o}{L_{t+j}^o} \right) \right]^2, \quad Y = \left[ \ln \left( \frac{H_{t+1}^o}{L_{t+1}^o} \right) \right]^2$$

We use this measure of bid-ask spread as a proxy for trading costs because it is much less time and data-intensive to calculate than intraday bid-ask spread measures, and because Corwin and Schultz (2012) demonstrate that it outperforms the Roll (1984), Lesmond et al. (1999), and Holden (2009) techniques for measuring bid-ask spreads.

The variable of interest in Eq. (1),  $\Delta ETF_{it-1}$ , is the change in the percentage of firm  $i$ 's shares held by all ETFs from the end of year  $t-2$  to the end of year  $t-1$ . Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that the coefficient  $\beta_1$  is positive, indicating that, *ceteris paribus*, increases in ETF ownership are associated with increases in bid-ask spreads. Change in ETF ownership may be correlated with overall change in institutional ownership and prior research suggests there might

be a relation between institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads.<sup>15</sup> To isolate the effect of change in ETF ownership on stock liquidity and to ensure that our results are not confounded by the relation of ETF ownership with institutional ownership, we include  $\Delta INST_{it-1}$  directly in Eq. (1) as an additional control variable.  $\Delta INST_{it-1}$  is the change in the percentage of firm  $i$ 's shares held by all institutions from the end of year  $t-2$  to the end of year  $t-1$ .<sup>16</sup>

In Eq. (1),  $Controls_{it-1}$  represents a vector of firm- and industry-related control variables nominated by prior literature. The vector includes the change in the log of market value of equity [ $\Delta LN(MVE)$ ] during year  $t-1$  because larger firms generally have smaller bid-ask spreads. Prior studies also find that bid-ask spreads increase with the return volatility and decrease with the share turnover (Copeland and Galai 1983). Accordingly, we control for the change in the annualized standard deviation of daily returns during year  $t-1$  [ $\Delta STD(RET)$ ] and the change in average share turnover from year  $t-2$  to year  $t-1$  ( $\Delta TURN$ ). We also include the change in book to market ratio ( $\Delta BTM$ ) during year  $t-1$  as a control for the effect of financial distress and/or growth opportunities on bid-ask spreads (Fama and French 1992, Lakonishok et al. 1994). Finally, to control for time and industry trends in bid-ask spreads, we include year and industry fixed effects.<sup>17</sup> The industry fixed effects are defined based on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry classification.

As an additional test of H1, we examine the association between changes in ETF ownership and another proxy of a firm's market liquidity or trading costs: an adjusted measure of the price impact of trades from Amihud (2002). The Amihud (2002) measure of the price impact of trades, also known as the illiquidity ratio,  $ILLIQ$ , is the ratio of average daily absolute returns to

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<sup>15</sup> Prior research on the relation between bid-ask spreads and institutional ownership is mixed. Glosten and Harris (1988) suggest that higher levels of concentrated institutional ownership will increase bid-ask spreads, while higher levels of dispersed institutional ownership might encourage competition that reduces bid-ask spreads.

<sup>16</sup> Our inferences are the same when we use the residual from the regression model  $\Delta ETF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta INST_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$  as a measure of change in ETF ownership that is orthogonal to the change in the level of institutional ownership.

<sup>17</sup> In untabulated analyses we explore the sensitivity of our inferences to the inclusion of year fixed effects. We do so to address concerns that the inclusion of year fixed effects limits our analyses to the variation in changes in ETF ownership relative to other firms in the same year, while ignoring the variation in total average year-over-year changes in ETF ownership (which may also have a significant explanatory power for variation in the dependent variables). Our inferences remain the same under the alternative specification that excludes year fixed effects. We tabulate results controlling for year fixed effects, because we believe that controlling for unobserved time-specific effects helps us better isolate the effects of changes in ETFs on variables of interest. We thank the referee for raising this issue.

average daily dollar volume. While *ILLIQ* is a well-accepted proxy for the price impact of trades (Goyenko et al. 2009), in the context of this paper, using *ILLIQ* as originally defined to test H1 complicates our analyses. Prior literature (Hasbrouck 2003, Yu 2005, Chen and Strother 2008, Fang and Sanger 2012, and Ivanov et al. 2013) shows that ETF ownership can affect both the numerator of the illiquidity ratio (the average daily absolute returns) and the denominator of the illiquidity ratio (the average daily dollar volume). In particular, changes in ETF ownership can mechanically induce greater trading volume without conferring an overall improvement in liquidity on the underlying stock (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi 2015). Indeed, during our sample period, the range of changes in volume is an order of magnitude larger than the range of changes in absolute returns. Hence, constraining the two components of the illiquidity ratio to share a single coefficient is not appropriate in our study.

To mitigate this problem, we decompose *ILLIQ* into two components (the numerator and the denominator) and estimate the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta ILLIQ\_N_{it} = & \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta ILLIQ\_D_{it} \\ & + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} + \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i \\ & + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$ILLIQ\_N_{it}$  is the daily absolute return for firm  $i$  averaged over all the trading days in year  $t$ . The dependent variable in Eq. (2),  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N_{it}$ , is the change in  $ILLIQ\_N_{it}$  from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$ .  $ILLIQ\_D_{it}$  is the daily dollar volume for firm  $i$  averaged over all the trading days in year  $t$  and  $\Delta ILLIQ\_D_{it}$  is the change in  $ILLIQ\_D_{it}$  from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$ .  $\Delta ETF_{it-1}$  and  $\Delta INST_{it-1}$  are as defined above.  $\Delta Controls_{it-1}$  denotes several control variables measured as of the end of year  $t-1$ . Specifically, it includes the log of market value of equity [ $LN(MVE)$ ] as of the end of year  $t-1$ , because we expect larger firms to exhibit smaller price impact of trades. In addition,  $\Delta Controls_{it-1}$  contains the change in book-to market-ratio ( $\Delta BTM$ ) during year  $t-1$  to control for the effects of financial distress and/or growth opportunities on  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N_{it}$ . In our estimation of Eq. (2) we also include year and industry fixed effects. Our hypothesis predicts that the coefficient  $\beta_1$  is positive, indicating that, *ceteris paribus* increases in ETF ownership are

associated with increases in absolute returns (and hence lower liquidity or higher trading costs for market participants).

Our second hypothesis (H2) states that an increase in ETF ownership is associated with deterioration in pricing efficiency of the underlying component security. We test this hypothesis using two proxies for the extent to which stock prices reflect firm-specific information: (1) stock return synchronicity, *SYNCH*, and (2) future earnings response coefficient, *FERC.SYNCH* is a measure of the extent to which variation in firm-level stock returns is explained by movements in market and related-industry returns. Roll (1988) posits that when greater relative levels of firm-specific information are being impounded into stock prices, the magnitude of the stock return synchronicity measure decreases. Wurgler (2000), Durnev et al. (2003), Durnev et al. (2004), and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) use this insight and provide evidence in support of it in a variety of settings. Because stock return synchronicity is negatively related to the amount of firm-specific information embedded in stock price, based on H2, we predict that changes in ETF ownership lead to positive changes in stock return synchronicity.

To estimate firm-specific measures of stock return synchronicity,  $SYNCH_{it}$ , we follow the methodology outlined by Durnev et al. (2003). First, for each firm-year observation we obtain the adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted  $R^2$ ) by regressing daily stock returns on the current and prior day's value-weighted market return ( $MKTRET$ ) and the current and prior day's value-weighted Fama and French 48 industry return ( $INDRET$ ):

$$RET_{id} = \alpha + \beta_1 MKTRET_d + \beta_2 MKTRET_{d-1} + \beta_3 INDRET_d + \beta_4 INDRET_{d-1} + \epsilon_{id} \quad (3)$$

In Eq. (3),  $RET_{id}$  is firm  $i$ 's stock return on day  $d$ ,  $MKTRET_d$  is the value-weighted market return on day  $d$ , and  $INDRET_d$  is the value-weighted return of firm  $i$ 's industry, defined using the Fama-French 48 classifications, on day  $d$ .<sup>18</sup> Eq. (3) is estimated separately for each firm-year,

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<sup>18</sup> We adopt this model of returns to measure firm-specific adjusted  $R^2$  (and, consequently, synchronicity) because it is the most frequently used in the literature (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004, Hutton et al 2010, Chan and Chan 2014). To ensure that our inferences are not affected by the method chosen to estimate firm-specific adjusted  $R^2$  we

using daily returns for firm  $i$  over the trading days in year  $t$ , with a minimum of 150 daily observations.

Next, for each firm-year observation we calculate the annual measure of stock return synchronicity,  $SYNCH_{it}$ , as the logarithmic transformation of  $R_{it}^2$  to create an unbounded continuous measure of synchronicity (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004, Hutton et al. 2010, Crawford et al. 2012, Hutton et al. 2010):<sup>19</sup>  $SYNCH_{it} = \log\left(\frac{R_{it}^2}{1-R_{it}^2}\right)$ . High values of the  $SYNCH_{it}$  measure indicate that a greater fraction of variation in firm-level stock returns is explained by variations in market and related-industry returns.

To test whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in the amount of firm-specific information that is being impounded into stock prices we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta SYNCH_{it} = & \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} \\ & + \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

In Eq. (4),  $\Delta SYNCH_{it}$  is the difference between firm  $i$ 's measure of  $SYNCH$  during year  $t$  and its value in year  $t-1$ .  $\Delta Controls_{it-1}$  indicates several annual change measures that prior research suggests are associated with changes in stock return synchronicity. Following Jin and Myers (2006), we control for changes in the skewness of firm  $i$ 's returns over year  $t-1$  ( $\Delta SKEW$ ). In addition, since Li et al. (2014) show that synchronicity is often confounded with systematic risk, we include the annual change in CAPM beta as a control for a firm's systematic risk. As additional controls, we include annual changes during year  $t-1$  in the log of market value of equity [ $\Delta LN(MVE)$ ], book-to-market ratio ( $\Delta BTM$ ), average share turnover ( $\Delta TURN$ ), and year and industry fixed effects.  $\Delta ETF_{it-1}$  and  $\Delta INST_{it-1}$  are defined and measured as in Eqs. (1) and (2). Our second hypothesis predicts that the coefficient  $\beta_1$  is positive, indicating that, *ceteris*

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also estimate synchronicity using the methodology outlined in Crawford et al (2012) and Li et al. (2014). Our inferences are the same when we use these alternate measurement techniques.

<sup>19</sup> In computing  $SYNCH_{it}$  we exclusively use adjusted  $R_{it}^2$  values. Following Crawford et al. (2012), we truncate the sample of adjusted  $R_{it}^2$  values at 0.0001.

*paribus*, increases in ETF ownership are associated with increases in stock return synchronicity.

Our second proxy for the extent to which stock prices reflect firm specific information is the future earnings response coefficient, which measures the extent to which current stock returns reflect future firm earnings. To test whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in the extent to which firm-level stock returns reflect future firm earnings, we follow prior literature (e.g., Kothari and Sloan 1992, Collins et al. 1994, Choi et al. 2011) and estimate several versions of the following regression model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 RET_{it} = & \beta_1 EARN_{it-1} + \beta_2 EARN_{it} + \beta_3 EARN_{it+1} + \beta_4 ETF_{it-1} + \beta_5 INST_{it-1} \\
 & + \beta_6 ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it-1} + \beta_7 ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it} + \beta_8 ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it+1} \\
 & + \sum_k \beta_k Controls_{it} + \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

In Eq. (5),  $RET_{it}$  represents firm-level stock returns during year  $t$ , and  $EARN_{it-1}$ ,  $EARN_{it}$ , and  $EARN_{it+1}$  denote firm-level net income before extraordinary items during years  $t-1$ ,  $t$ , and  $t+1$ , scaled by market value of equity. The coefficient  $\beta_3$  measures the relation between current firm-level stock returns and future firm earnings; prior research refers to this coefficient as the “future earnings response coefficient” (FERC) and offers it as a measure of the extent to which current stock returns reflect/predict future firm earnings (Lundholm and Myers 2002, Ettredge et al. 2005, Choi et al. 2011). To address our main research question, we include as explanatory variables the level of ETF ownership ( $ETF_{it-1}$ ) at the end of year  $t-1$  as well as the interaction between the level of ETF ownership and past, current, and future earnings ( $ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it\pm j}$ ). Our second hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the interaction of ETF ownership with current and future firm earnings is negative, indicating that *FERCs* are lower for firms with higher ETF ownership (i.e.,  $\beta_7$  and, more importantly,  $\beta_8$  are negative).

As in previous equations,  $Controls_{it}$  denotes a number of control variables as suggested by prior research. Following Collins et al. (1994), we control for future firm-level stock returns,  $RET_{it+1}$ , to address the potential measurement error induced by using actual future earnings as a proxy for expected future earnings. In addition, to account for the effect of a firm’s growth on

the ability of its stock returns to reflect future earnings, we control for total asset growth from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$ ,  $ATGROWTH_t$ . Also, we control for the possibility that firms experiencing losses may have lower FERCs by including an indicator variable,  $LOSS_t$ , that equals one if the firm experiences a loss in year  $t+1$  (i.e.,  $EARN_{it+1} < 0$ ) and 0 otherwise.  $Controls_{it}$  also includes the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the end of year  $t$ .

We also examine how FERCs vary with changes in ETF ownership by decomposing the level of ETF ownership at the end of period  $t-1$  into the sum of the level of ETF ownership at the end of period  $t-2$  and the change in ETF ownership during period  $t-1$ :

$$ETF_{t-1} = ETF_{t-2} + \Delta ETF_{t-1}$$

Thus, we re-estimate Eq. (5) using  $ETF_{t-2}$  and  $\Delta ETF_{t-1}$  in lieu of  $ETF_{t-1}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} RET_{it} = & \beta_1 EARN_{it-1} + \beta_2 EARN_{it} + \beta_3 EARN_{it+1} + \beta_4 ETF_{it-2} + & (5a) \\ & \beta_5 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_6 ETF_{it-2} \times EARN_{it-1} + \beta_7 ETF_{it-2} \times EARN_{it} + \beta_8 ETF_{it-2} \times \\ & EARN_{it+1} + \beta_9 \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it-1} + \beta_{10} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it} + \\ & \beta_{11} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARN_{it+1} + \beta_{12} INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k Controls_{it} + \\ & \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

In estimating Eq. (5a), we expect that  $\beta_7$  and  $\beta_8$  – the coefficients on the interactions of lagged levels of ETF ownership with current and future firm earnings (i.e.,  $ETF_{t-2} \times EARN_t$  and  $ETF_{t-2} \times EARN_{t+1}$ ) – as well as  $\beta_{10}$  and  $\beta_{11}$  – the coefficients on the interactions of lagged changes in ETF ownership with current and future firm earnings (i.e.,  $\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARN_t$  and  $\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARN_{t+1}$ ) – are negative.

The consequences of changes in ETF ownership on stock pricing efficiency may differ for “macro-based” (systematic or aggregate) and “firm-specific” (or idiosyncratic) components of earnings. To test this conjecture, we follow the procedure in GNZ and decompose total earnings into “macro-based” and “firm-specific” components by estimating the following regression:

$$EARN_{it} = \beta_1 EARNMKT_t + \beta_2 EARNIND_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (6)$$

In Eq. (6),  $EARNMKT_t$  is the size-weighted average of year  $t$  earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with available earnings information in Compustat.  $EARNIND_t$  is the size-weighted average of year  $t$  earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.

For each firm-year, we define the systematic or aggregate portion of earnings ( $EARNAGG_{it}$ ) as the fitted value from the annual estimation of Eq. (6). The residual portion is defined as the idiosyncratic or firm-specific portion of earnings ( $EARNFIRM_{it}$ ). Using these components of earnings, we estimate the following modified version of Eq. (5):

$$\begin{aligned} RET_{it} = & \beta_1 EARNAGG_{it-1} + \beta_2 EARNFIRM_{it-1} + \beta_3 EARNAGG_{it} + \beta_4 EARNFIRM_{it} \quad (5b) \\ & + \beta_5 EARNAGG_{it+1} + \beta_6 EARNFIRM_{it+1} + \beta_7 ETF_{it-2} + \beta_8 \Delta ETF_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_9 ETF_{it-2} \times EARNAGG_{it-1} + \beta_{10} ETF_{it-2} \times EARNAGG_{it} + \beta_{11} ETF_{it-2} \\ & \quad \times EARNAGG_{it+1} \\ & + \beta_{12} ETF_{it-2} \times EARNFIRM_{it-1} + \beta_{13} ETF_{it-2} \times EARNFIRM_{it} + \beta_{14} ETF_{it-2} \\ & \quad \times EARNFIRM_{it+1} \\ & + \beta_{15} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARNAGG_{it-1} + \beta_{16} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARNAGG_{it} + \beta_{17} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \\ & \quad \times EARNAGG_{it+1} \\ & + \beta_{18} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARNFIRM_{it-1} + \beta_{19} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \times EARNFIRM_{it} + \beta_{20} \Delta ETF_{it-1} \\ & \quad \times EARNFIRM_{it+1} \\ & + \beta_{21} INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k Controls_{it} + \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

With the exception of  $EARNAGG_{it}$  and  $EARNFIRM_{it}$ , all variables in Eq. (5b) remain as defined in Eq. (5a). H2 predicts that the coefficients on the interaction of lagged ETF ownership measures with current and future macro-based and firm-specific earnings will be negative (i.e.,  $\beta_{10}$ ,  $\beta_{11}$ ,  $\beta_{16}$ , and  $\beta_{17}$  for macro-based earnings;  $\beta_{13}$ ,  $\beta_{14}$ ,  $\beta_{19}$ , and  $\beta_{20}$  for firm-specific

earnings).

As an additional test of H2, we examine how ETF ownership relates to the number of analysts covering the firm during a year. H2 predicts that higher ETF ownership will lead to lower incentives for information acquisition for the underlying securities. To the extent that analysts are drawn to firms that are more attractive to individual investors, we expect that firms with increases in ETF ownership will experience reductions in analyst coverage. To test this conjecture, we estimate several versions of the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta ANALYST_{it} = & \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} \\ & + \sum_j \beta_j INDST\_FE_i + \sum_l \beta_l YEAR\_FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

In Eq. (7),  $\Delta ANALYST_{it}$  is the change from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$  in the number of unique analysts on I/B/E/S providing forecasts of firm  $i$ 's one-year-ahead earnings. As before,  $\Delta Controls_{it-1}$  represents annual changes in a number of control variables, measured as the change in the level of each variable from year  $t-2$  to year  $t-1$ , which are suggested by prior literature. Barth et al. (2001) demonstrate that firms with large research and development expenses or intangible assets experience greater analyst coverage. Accordingly, we include the annual change in the proportion of research and development expenses relative to total operating expenses ( $\Delta RD\_F_{it-1}$ ) and the annual change in the proportion of intangible assets relative to total assets ( $\Delta INTAN\_F_{it-1}$ ) as controls. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), we also control for annual change in return volatility [ $\Delta STD(RET)_{it-1}$ ]. To capture the effect of stock return momentum on levels of analyst coverage, we control for prior firm-level 6-month equity returns ( $MOM_{it-1}$ ), measured as of the end of year  $t-1$ . Eq. (7) also includes controls for firm size [ $LN(MVE)$ ], change in book-to-market ratio ( $\Delta BTM$ ), and change in share turnover ( $\Delta TURN$ ). Our second hypothesis predicts that the coefficient  $\beta_1$  is negative, indicating that, *ceteris paribus*, changes in ETF ownership are associated with decline in number of analysts covering a firm.

To control for potential time-series as well as cross-sectional correlations between firm-specific measures, we base our inferences from all equations on  $t$ -statistics calculated using standard errors clustered by both firm and year (e.g., Gow et al. 2010). All variables used in the estimation of Eqs. (1) to (7) are also defined in Appendix A.<sup>20</sup>

## **IV. Empirical Analyses**

### **IV.1 Sample construction and descriptive statistics**

We determine year-end ETF ownership by first using CRSP, Compustat, and OptionMetrics data bases to identify all ETFs traded on the major U.S. exchanges. Specifically, we identify ETFs as securities on CRSP with a share code of ‘73’ and securities on Compustat or OptionMetrics with an issue type of ‘%’. After identifying candidate ETFs, we obtain for each ETF the reported equity holdings from the Thomson Financial S12 database. For some ETFs, the Thomson Financial S12 database does not provide regular reporting of equity holdings. In these instances, we hand collect additional holdings data from Bloomberg Financial. ETFs without any reported holding data in the Thomson Financial database or Bloomberg Financial are excluded from the sample. This process yields a sample of 443 unique ETFs. Appendix B provides a list of the 10 largest ETFs in our sample, ranked based on the average assets under management.

Using the annual panel of holdings for each ETF we define, for every stock in a given year, the ETF ownership variable ( $ETF$ ) as the aggregate number of shares held by all ETFs divided by total number of shares outstanding in that year. We repeat this process for every firm-year between 2000 and 2014 to construct our panel. Our sample begins in 2000 because it

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<sup>20</sup> Note that our main identification strategy is to link *changes* in ETF ownership to subsequent changes in the variables of interest. An alternative approach is to identify a discontinuity in ETF ownership arising from an exogenous event (i.e., an event unrelated to firms’ trading costs or information environment). For example, Chang, Hong and Liskovich (CHL; 2015) use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to study the effect of Russell 2000 index membership on stock returns. In an attempt to adopt the same strategy, we obtained the CHL dataset of instrumented Russell membership changes and closely follow their approach. Unfortunately, we found that ETF ownership does not change significantly immediately surrounding Russell 2000 index inclusions/exclusions. While this result is consistent with CHL’s own finding of no relation between this event and changes in overall institutional ownership, it unfortunately means that the Russell 2000 membership reconstitution is not an effective instrument for changes in ETF ownership.

is the first year with sufficient variation in ETF ownership to conduct our analyses. Our sample ends in 2014 due to data availability constraints. All firm-years with no reported ETF ownership during the sample period are included in the sample with  $ETF_{it} = 0$ .

Figure 1 reports the average ETF ownership across firms for each year of our sample. The figure reveals a significant increase in average ETF ownership over our sample period, from roughly 1% in 2000 to nearly 5.5% in 2014. This is consistent with the rapid increase in the dollar value of ETF trading as a percentage of total exchange dollar value traded. For example, during June 2015, the total value of ETF trading represented close to 28% of the total daily exchange value traded (Pisani 2015), which represents a 35% increase in percentage of value of ETF trading from June 2014. Clearly ETFs have quickly become an important vehicle for traders in the equity market.

We obtain market-related data on all US-listed firms from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. To be included in our sample, each firm-year observation must have information on stock price, number of shares outstanding, and book value of equity. We also require sufficient data to calculate the standard deviation of daily returns and average share turnover within each firm year. We restrict our analyses to firms with non-negative book-to-market ratios in every year of our sample period. This results in a sample of 39,863 firm-years and 5,992 unique firms. In some of our analyses, we also require annual data on analysts coverage. In such analyses, our sample size is reduced to 29,562 firm-year observations and 4,184 unique firms. The number of observations included in each regression varies according to data availability.

Panel A of table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analyses. Of particular interest for our analyses is the level of ETF ownership, measured as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by all ETFs, and changes in ETF ownership. The mean (median) percentage ETF ownership is 3.31% (2.52%). This is much lower than the level of institutional ownership, which has a mean (median) of 57.78% (62.50%). We also observe consistently larger annual changes in institutional ownership relative changes in ETF ownership. The mean (median) change in ETF ownership is 48 (27.7) basis points while the mean (median)

change in institutional ownership is 264 (109) basis points. The distributional statistics of both ETF and institutional ownership in our sample are consistent with prior literature (Hamm 2014, Jiambalvo 2002). Nevertheless, we expect the two measures to differ in many important respects and have different effects on measures of trading costs and pricing efficiency.

Panel A also reveals that  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$  and  $\Delta ILLIQ\_D$ , the two components of changes in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, have notably different variances.  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$  is very narrowly distributed with a standard deviation of .801, while  $\Delta ILLIQ\_D$  exhibits a significantly larger standard deviation of 15.661. This difference provides further support for our decision to decompose the Amihud (2002) ratio into its two components in an attempt to estimate the effect of changes in ETF ownership on  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$  controlling for  $\Delta ILLIQ\_D$ .

Table 1, panels B and C present Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the key levels and changes of variables in our regression analysis. In our sample,  $\Delta ETF$  is positively correlated with changes in book to market ratio (Pearson coef. = 0.022) and turnover (Pearson coef. = 0.07). Panel B reveals that  $\Delta ETF$  is positively correlated with two proxies of changes in trading costs,  $\Delta HLSREAD$  (Pearson coef. = .171) and  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$  (Pearson coef. = .193). Consistent with our hypotheses,  $\Delta ETF$  is also positively correlated with  $\Delta SYNCH$  (Pearson coef. = .080) and negatively correlated with  $\Delta ANALYST$  (Pearson coef. = -.005).

## **IV.2 Testing H1: ETF ownership and trading costs of market participants**

Tables 2 and 3 present regression summary statistics from the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2) which are designed to test our first hypothesis using two measures of liquidity that capture trading costs and various model specifications.

Column 1 of table 2 reveals that change in bid-ask spread,  $\Delta HLSREAD$ , exhibits the expected relations with our control variables.  $\Delta HLSREAD$  is negatively associated with increases in firm size (coef. = -0.044,  $t$ -stat. = -1.67), positive associated with increases in the book-to-market ratio (coef. = 0.051,  $t$ -stat. = 2.42), and positively associated with increases in return volatility (coef. = 0.001,  $t$ -stat. = 1.86). According to column 1 of table 2, changes in ETF ownership are positively related to changes in bid-ask spreads (coef. = 0.016,  $t$ -stat. = -2.41).

This finding supports our hypothesis that, *ceteris paribus*, the trading costs of market participants increase with changes in ETF ownership. To ensure that the results in column 1 are not confounded by the relation between changes in institutional ownership with  $\Delta HLSPREAD$  and with  $\Delta ETF$ , we estimate column 1, controlling for  $\Delta INST$ . Column 2 reveals that consistent with H1, there exists a significantly positive association between changes in *ETF* ownership and changes in *HLSPREAD* (coef. = 0.017, *t*-stat. = 2.51). The average *HLSPREAD* in our sample is 1.07%, thus these results show that a one percentage point increase in *ETF* ownership is associated with an increase of 1.6% in the average *HLSPREAD* over the next year. The coefficient on institutional ownership is slightly negative and not significantly different from 0 (coef. = -0.000, *t*-stat. = -0.58). These results are wholly consistent with the findings of Hamm (2014) and suggest that her findings extend in our longer-horizon.

Results from estimating Eq. (2) are presented in table 3 and provide evidence on the association between changes in of *ETF* ownership and another measure of changes in trading costs. Column 1 reveals that  $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$  has a strong positive association with changes in book-to-market ratio (coef. = 0.172, *t*-stat. = 4.20) and changes in *ILLIQ\\_D* (coef. = 0.004, *t*-stat. = 5.38). The results in column 1 also reveal a strong positive relation between changes in *ETF* ownership and changes in *ILLIQ\\_N* (coef. = 0.042, *t*-stat. = 2.55), suggesting that increases in *ETF* ownership are associated with increases in the absolute firm returns. Column 2 of table 3 reveals that controlling for  $\Delta INST$  does not alter this observed relation. The average daily absolute return in our sample is 2.1%, indicating that a one percentage point increase in *ETF* ownership is associated with an increase of 2% in average daily absolute returns over the next year. Taken together, the results presented in tables 2 and 3 provide strong evidence in support for H1 that an increase in *ETF* ownership is accompanied by an increase in trading costs for market participants.

### **IV.3 Testing H2: *ETF* ownership and the deterioration of pricing efficiency**

#### **IV.3a Synchronicity and FERC tests**

Tables 4 and 5 present regression summary statistics from the estimation of Eqs. (4) and (5), which are designed to test our second hypothesis using two proxies for the extent to which

stock returns reflect firm-specific information. Table 4 presents summary statistics from the estimation of two versions of Eq. (4), which models the relation between changes in ETF ownership and changes in annual stock return synchronicity. Column 1 reveals that the changes in synchronicity,  $\Delta SYNCH$ , exhibit the expected relations with our control variables. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Li et al. 2014),  $\Delta SYNCH$  is positively associated with increases in firm size (coef. = 0.595,  $t$ -stat. = 8.78) and negatively associated with changes in systematic risk,  $\Delta BETA$  (coef. = -.704,  $t$ -stat. = -14.85). Columns 1 and 2 reveal that changes in ETF ownership are significantly positively related to changes in stock return synchronicity (coef. = .090,  $t$ -stat. = 3.70 and 3.67). As is shown in column 2, controlling for changes in institutional ownership does not affect the positive association between  $\Delta ETF$  and  $\Delta SYNCH$ . Our results indicate that a one-percentage point increase in ETF ownership is associated with approximately a 9 percentage point increase in the average annual change in return synchronicity. This finding supports our hypothesis that increases in ETF ownership are associated with a deterioration of pricing efficiency for the underlying component securities.

Table 5 presents regression summary statistics from the estimations of Eqs. (5), (5a), and (5b) which are designed to examine the relation between ETF ownership and the extent to which current firm-level returns reflect future firm or macro-based and firm-specific earnings. In these estimations, measures of ETF ownership range from 0 to 1 (rather than from 0 to 100) to be more similar in ranges of magnitudes of the earnings and returns measures. Consistent with prior literature, in both columns of Panel A, we observe a positive future earnings response coefficient,  $FERC$  (coef. = 0.015,  $t$ -stat. = 4.80 and 4.32). Consistent with H2, column 1 of panel A reveals that the interactions of current and future earnings with ETF ownership carry negative coefficients that are significantly different from 0 (coef. = -3.662,  $t$ -stat. = -2.60 and coef. = -0.212,  $t$ -stat. = -4.64). This suggests that, controlling for  $INST_{t-1}$  and a host of other variables prescribed by prior literature [ $LOSS_t$ ,  $ATGROWTH_t$ ,  $RET_{t+1}$ ,  $LN(MVE)_{t-1}$ ], firms with higher levels of ETF ownership experience lower future earnings response coefficients. In other words, firm-level returns of firms with higher levels of ETF ownership incorporate less future earnings-related information. Column 2 of panel A presents summary statistics from the estimation of Eq. (5a) in which the level of ETF ownership is split into lagged level of ETF ownership and most

recent period change in ETF ownership. The results in column 2 provide further support for H2 by showing that the coefficients on interactions of current and future earnings with changes in ETF ownership are also significantly negative (coef. = -3.636,  $t$ -stat. = -2.68 and coef. = -0.195,  $t$ -stat. = -2.07). This suggests that firms experiencing a one-percentage point increase in ETF ownership also experience a 14% reduction in the average magnitude of their future earnings response coefficients.

Taken together, the results presented in tables 4 and 5 indicate that an increase in ETF ownership is associated with increase in the co-movement of firm-level stock returns with market and related-industry stock returns, and with a decline in the predictive power of current firm-level stock returns for future firm earnings. These two findings support our second hypothesis that stock prices of firms with high ETF ownership are impounding less firm-specific information.

#### **IV.3b Alternative earnings response tests**

In a contemporaneous study, Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016; hereafter GNZ) explore the impact of ETF trading activity on the response of returns to contemporaneous earnings news. Using same-quarter changes in ETF ownership as a proxy for ETF trading activity, they demonstrate that ETF trading is associated with a stronger association of returns to contemporaneous earnings. They further document that the effect is concentrated in the association of returns to the systematic (or macro-based) component of earnings news. Their overall conclusion from these findings is that ETF trading improves a stock's informational efficiency.

Given the difference in the conclusions of the GNZ study relative to our own, we take several steps to reconcile their findings with ours. The first key difference between their setting and ours is rooted in the time lag between measurement of changes in ETF ownership, returns, and firm earnings. Because GNZ's focus is on understanding the impact of contemporaneous ETF trading, they measure changes in ETF ownership and returns over the exact same quarter. In contrast, we are interested in understanding the long-run implications of increases in ETF

ownership on pricing efficiency, so we measure levels and changes of ETF ownership *prior* to the start of the returns measurement window. To verify that this shift in ETF measurement window is a key driver of the differences between our results and those of GNZ, we estimate Eq. (5b) while measuring changes in ETF ownership and earnings contemporaneously with returns, as GNZ does.

Column 1 of table 5, panel B presents the results of this estimation. These results show that the coefficients on the variables of interest (the interaction of  $\Delta ETF$  with contemporaneous aggregate and firm-specific earnings) are positive, consistent with the findings reported by GNZ. To ensure that the effect documented by GNZ does not subsume those reported in our FERC analyses, we also estimate Eq. (5b) including both the GNZ measurement of  $\Delta ETF$  and our original measurement of  $\Delta ETF$ . The summary statistics from this estimation are presented in column 2 of table 5, panel B. This test shows that all our prior findings on a reduction in FERCs with increased ETF ownership continue to hold, after controlling for the GNZ variables. Specifically, all eight of the interaction terms between ETF ownership and future earnings measures have negative coefficients. In particular, the coefficient of lagged changes in ETF ownership with future firm-specific earnings is significantly negative (coef. = -0.172, *t*-stat. = -3.26), as is the interaction of the lagged level of ETF ownership with future firm-specific earnings (coef. = -0.136, *t*-stat. = -2.02). These results support our hypothesis that increases in ETF ownership lead to slower incorporation of firm-specific earnings information into stock prices.

The analyses presented in table 5, panel B show the importance of lagging the changes in ETF ownership variable, which is a key difference between our study and GNZ. However, there are other research design differences that might have contributed to the differences in results (such as annual vs. quarterly data, the measurement window for future earnings, the choice of control variables, and their use of seasonally adjusted earnings). To address these differences more completely, we re-estimate the main results from GNZ's Eq. (3) following their research design and sample construction.

The summary statistics from this estimation are presented in column I of table 6. Their main variable of interest is the interaction of the contemporaneous quarterly change in ETF

ownership ( $\delta ETF_t$ ) with current period seasonally adjusted earnings ( $SEARN_t$ ). For firm  $i$  in quarter  $t$ ,  $SEARN_{it}$ , seasonally adjusted earnings news, is defined as the difference between quarter  $t$  and quarter  $t-4$  earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by stock price at the beginning of quarter  $t$ . Consistent with the results reported by GNZ, our estimate of the coefficient on the interaction  $\delta ETF_t \times SEARN_{it}$  is positive and significantly different from zero (coef = 0.438,  $t$ -stat. = 2.458).

Having successfully replicated the results reported by GNZ, we further explore how research design modifications affect the gap between their results and ours. The estimates in columns II through VII of table 6 are from re-estimations of GNZ's Eq. (3) with modifications to the measurement windows of  $\delta ETF$  and  $SEARN$ . Specifically, in column II we hold all other aspects of the research design constant (and consistent with GNZ), but allow for the measurement of  $\delta ETF$  to take place prior to the return measurement window rather than in the same quarter as the stock returns. In other words, we shift from  $\delta ETF_t$  to  $\delta ETF_{t-1}$ . Making this shift causes the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction of  $\delta ETF_{t-1}$  with  $SEARN$  to decline (coef. = 0.386 versus 0.438) and also causes the statistical significance to fall ( $t$ -stat. = 1.729 versus 2.458).

The next modification we examine is the effect of measuring annual changes in ETF ownership rather than quarterly. We accomplish this by summing quarterly changes over the prior four quarters. We use this four-quarter sum of ETF ownership changes ( $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$ ) instead of the contemporaneous ETF ownership change in the estimation results presented in column III of table 6. The results in column III reveal that measuring ETF changes annually notably changes the inferences of the test, as the interaction of  $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$  with  $SEARN$  is positive (coef = .101) but not significantly different from zero ( $t$ -stat. = 0.767).

In columns IV through VII we maintain use of the four-quarter sum of quarterly ETF ownership changes ( $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$ ) as an annual measure of changes in ETF ownership. The variation in columns IV through VII arises from shifting forward the measurement of  $SEARN$ . In column IV (V, VI),  $SEARN$  is defined as the quarterly earnings for quarter  $t+1$  ( $t+2$ ,  $t+3$ ) relative to the returns measurement window. In each iteration of the estimation, the coefficient on the interaction of  $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$  with  $SEARN$  grows increasingly negative. For example, Column

VI shows that when examining three-quarter-ahead earnings, the interaction of  $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$  with  $SEARN_{t+3}$  bears a significantly negative coefficient (coef. = -0.568,  $t$ -stat. = -1.809). This negative interaction effect is consistent with our second hypothesis.

In column VII we sum the quarterly earnings for quarters  $t$  through  $t+3$  to approximate an annual version of future earnings ( $SEARN_{SUM\ t\ to\ t+3}$ ). Column VII of Table 6 presents estimations where the combined modifications to the measurement of ETF ownership changes and earnings bring the overall specification close to our main FERC test, Eq. (5). Specifically, we use  $SEARN_{SUM\ t\ to\ t+3}$  as an approximation of future annual earnings and  $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$  as an approximation of annual change in ETF ownership *prior* to the returns measurement window. The results in column VII further support our second hypothesis; the coefficient on the interaction of  $\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$  with  $SEARN_{SUM\ t\ to\ t+3}$  is -0.198 ( $t$ -stat. = -1.848). This indicates that with larger increases in ETF ownership over the past year, current returns capture less information about firm earnings over the next year.

### IV.3c Analyst coverage tests

Table 7 presents regression summary statistics from the estimation of Eq. (7), which is designed to examine the effect of changes in ETF ownership on analyst coverage. The signs on the control variables are largely consistent with those reported in prior literature. For example, Column 1 shows that changes in analyst coverage,  $\Delta ANALYST$ , are higher among firms with larger increases in research and development expenses (coef. = 1.965,  $t$ -stat. = 2.79), and firms with larger increases in intangible assets (coef. = 1.386,  $t$ -stat. = 3.77). In columns I and II the coefficients on  $\Delta ETF$  are positive but not significantly different from zero (coef. = 0.042 and 0.017,  $t$ -stat. = 1.24 and 0.46). These results suggest that increases in ETF ownership in over year  $t-1$  have no significant effect on analyst coverage. However, the coefficient on  $\Delta INST$  presented in column II is positive and highly significant (coef. = 0.013,  $t$ -stat. = 9.06), suggesting that an increase in institutional ownership over year  $t-1$  does tend to increase analyst coverage in year  $t$ .

To explore the possibility that ETF ownership might have a more long-run effect on analyst coverage, we include lagged level of ETF ownership as an additional explanatory

variable in the estimation of results presented in columns III and IV. The results show that the level of ETF ownership from year  $t-2$  exhibits a strong negative relation with changes in analyst coverage in year  $t$ . For example, column IV shows that higher ETF ownership is associated with lower analyst coverage (coef. =  $-0.025$ ,  $t$ -stat. =  $-3.25$ ), after controlling for both the level and the change in lagged institutional ownership.

In sum, over shorter windows we find no reliable evidence that links changes in ETF ownership to changes in the number of analysts covering a firm. Over longer horizons, our results do suggest that increased ETF ownership is associated with lower analyst coverage. However, we hasten to point out that as the time gap between the measurement of ETF ownership and analyst coverage increases, so does the likelihood that some other confounding factor is at work. Thus we think that our results on the consequences of ETF ownership on analyst coverage should be interpreted cautiously. At best, our findings are consistent with the idea that analysts slowly respond to changes in the information environment associated with changes in ETF ownership.

## **V. Summary and concluding remarks**

In this study, we use changes in ETF ownership to examine the economic linkages between the market for firm-specific information, the market for individual securities, and the role of uninformed traders. The market for ETFs has grown dramatically in the past decade and ETFs now constitute close to 30% of the daily value traded in US exchanges. By focusing on the natural growth of exchange-traded funds over the past decade, we study how changes in the composition of a firm's investor base impacts its share pricing efficiency.

Prior theoretical work offers two predictions on the possible impacts of ETF ownership. First, a number of studies in the market microstructure literature suggest that trading associated with the ETF-arbitrage mechanism can improve intraday price discovery for the underlying stocks (Hasbrouck 2003, Yu 2005, Chen and Strother 2008, Fang and Sanger 2012, and Ivanov et al. 2013). This line of inquiry suggests that increased ETF ownership can lead to improved pricing efficiency in the underlying securities, particularly in the short-run.

On the other hand, the noisy rational expectations (NRE) literature suggests a possible negative relation between ETF ownership and pricing efficiency. A number of models in this literature (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Hellwig 1980, Admati 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1981, Verrecchia 1982, and Kyle 1985, 1989) predict that pricing efficiency will be a function of the information costs faced by agents seeking to profit from becoming informed about the asset. To the extent that a migration of uninformed investors away from underlying component securities increases their information costs, these models predict that increased ETF ownership will lead to a decline in pricing efficiency, particularly in the long-run.

Our study examines, and provides support for, both predictions. We first demonstrate that an increase in ETF ownership is associated with an increase in firms' trading costs. This is consistent with the idea of uninformed traders exiting the market of the underlying security in favor of the ETF. Next, we find that increases in ETF ownership are associated with increases in stock return synchronicity, decreases in future earnings response coefficients (FERCs), and decline in the number of analysts covering the firm. These findings are consistent with the idea that as uninformed traders exit the market for component securities and trading costs for these securities rise, their pricing efficiency declines.

Our main results link ETF ownership changes to subsequent changes in FERC. Consistent with the microstructure literature and Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016), we find a positive contemporaneous relation between increases in ETF ownership and the market's ability to incorporate same-quarter earnings (i.e., higher ERCs).. More importantly, we go a step further and show that this positive relation holds only when all three variables (stock returns, ETF changes, and earnings) are measured in the same quarter. As the time lag between ETF changes and future earnings is increased, the relation turns negative. This negative relation becomes stronger as we increase the time lag between past ETF changes and current period returns. In other words, while same-quarter ETF trading seems to improve pricing efficiency, the more salient result over the longer run is that increases in ETF ownership lead to a deterioration in pricing efficiency for the underlying securities. These findings are largely consistent with predictions from the NRE literature.

We also provide some evidence on the differential impact of changes in ETF ownership on the incorporation of “macro-based” versus “firm-specific” components of earnings news. GNZ find a positive relation between ETF changes and pricing efficiency, and show the effect is primarily driven by better price integration of macro-based earnings. We replicate their main findings and demonstrate that while ETF trading may improve pricing discovery for same-quarter macro-based earnings, over the longer term (beginning with the next quarter), increases in ETF ownership actually lead to lower FERCs, for both macro-based and firm-specific components of earnings news.

Our findings contribute to a growing literature on the economic consequences of basket or index-linked products. The rapid increase in index-linked products in recent years has attracted the attention of investors, regulators, and financial researchers. Adopting key insights from information economics, we present empirical evidence on how incentives in the market for information can affect pricing in the market for the underlying securities. Our results suggest that ETF ownership can lead to increased trading costs for market participants, with further consequences for the amount of firm-specific information that is incorporated into stock prices.

These findings highlight the link between information costs and market pricing efficiency. Lee and So (2015) argue that the study of market efficiency involves the analysis of a joint equilibrium in which supply must equal demand in the market for information about the underlying security, as well as in the market for the security itself. In the same spirit, Pedersen (2015) argues that financial markets are “efficiently inefficient” – that is, markets are “inefficient enough that money managers can be compensated for their costs through the profits of their trading strategies, and efficient enough that the profits after costs do not encourage additional active investing.” Our study provides support for this view of market efficiency, and our main findings bring into sharp relief the close relationship between the market for stocks and the market for information about these stocks.

It is useful to remind ourselves of an important caveat imposed by our research design. While we have demonstrated an association between lagged changes in ETF ownership and changes in firms’ trading costs and pricing efficiency, this association alone does not imply

causality. It is possible that both the changes in ETF ownership and the subsequent changes in other firm characteristics are due to another, as yet unidentified, latent variable. We cannot think of a good candidate variable, but our inability to do so does not preclude its existence. As a minimum, we have documented a set of empirical findings that are broadly consistent with an information-based explanation, which future researchers seeking an alternative explanation should address.

It is also important to interpret our findings in context. Our evidence suggests the growth of ETFs may have (unintended) long-run consequences for the pricing efficiency of the underlying securities. However, ETFs are clearly an important development in financial markets, which have brought many well-documented benefits to investors. We have not conducted a welfare analysis and our findings should not be construed an indictment against these funds. Rather, we view these findings as yet another reminder that the informational efficiency of financial markets is not, after all, a free good.

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## Appendix A: Variable Definitions

Variable:	Definition
$ANALYST_{it}$	= The number of unique analysts in I/B/E/S that provide forecasts of year $t$ earnings for firm $i$
$ATGROWTH_{it}$	= Growth in assets for firm $i$ from year $t-1$ to year $t$ .
$BETA_{it}$	= The $\beta_1$ coefficient from the firm-year estimation of the model $(RET - R_f)_{id} = \alpha + \beta_1(MKT - R_f)_d + \epsilon_{id}$
	where $(RET - R_f)_{id}$ is firm $i$ 's return less the risk-free rate on day $d$ and $(MKT - R_f)_d$ is the value-weighted market return less the risk-free rate on day $d$ . The model is estimated using daily returns over the trading days in the year $t$ , with a minimum of 150 trading days.
$BTM_{it}$	= The book to market ratio of firm $i$ at the end of year $t$
$EARN_{it}$	= Earnings before extraordinary items for firm $i$ in year $t$ scaled by market value of equity
$EARNAGG_{it}$	= The fitted value from the firm-year estimation of the model $EARN_{it} = \beta_1 EARNMKT_t + \beta_2 EARNIND_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$ where $EARNMKT_t$ is the size-weighted average of year $t$ earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with available earnings information in Compustat and $EARNIND_{it}$ is the size-weighted average of year $t$ earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.
$EARNFIRM_{it}$	= The residual value from the firm-year estimation of the model $EARN_{it} = \beta_1 EARNMKT_t + \beta_2 EARNIND_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$ where $EARNMKT_t$ is the size-weighted average of year $t$ earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with available earnings information in Compustat and $EARNIND_{it}$ is the size-weighted average of year $t$ earnings before extraordinary items for all firms with the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.
$ETF_{it}$	= The percentage of firm $i$ 's common shares outstanding held by ETFs at the end of year $t$
$HLSPREAD_{it}$	= The Corwin and Schultz (2012) measure of bid-ask spread for firm $i$ in year $t$
$ILLIQ\_N_{it}$	= The average over year $t$ of absolute daily equity returns for firm $i$ (the numerator of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio)
$ILLIQ\_D_{it}$	= The average over year $t$ of dollar volume for firm $i$ (the denominator of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio)
$INST_{it}$	= The percentage of firm $i$ 's common shares outstanding held by institutions at the end of year $t$

- $INTAN\_F_{it}$  = The ratio of intangible assets to total assets for firm  $i$  in year  $t$
- $LN(MVE)_{it}$  = The natural logarithm of firm  $i$ 's market value of equity at the end of year  $t$
- $LOSS_{it}$  = Indicator variable equaling one if firm  $i$  experienced a loss (defined as  $EARN < 0$ ) in year  $t$
- $MOM_{it}$  = Cumulative firm  $i$  stock returns for months -12 to -6 relative to the year  $t$  end date.
- $MTB_{it}$  = The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm  $i$  at the end of quarter  $t$
- $RD\_F_{it}$  = The ratio of research and development expenses to total operating expenses for firm  $i$  in year  $t$
- $RET_{it}$  = The annual return for firm  $i$  in year  $t$
- $SEARN_{it}$  = Seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings, defined as  

$$\frac{EARN_{it} - EARN_{it-4}}{P_{it-1}}$$
where  $EARN_{it}$  is earnings before extraordinary items for firm  $i$  in quarter  $t$  and  $P_{t-1}$  is firm  $i$ 's stock price at the end of quarter  $t-1$
- $SKEW_{it}$  = The skewness of firm  $i$ 's daily returns over year  $t$
- $SLOSS_{it}$  = Indicator variable equaling one if  $SEARN_{it} < 0$  in quarter  $t$
- $STD_{it}$  = Standard deviation of firm  $i$ 's earnings per share excluding extraordinary items over the 20 quarters prior to quarter  $t$
- $STD(RET)_{it}$  = The standard deviation of firm  $i$ 's daily returns over year  $t$
- $SYNCH_{it}$  = A logarithmic transformation of  $R_{it}^2$  defined as  $\log\left(\frac{R_{it}^2}{1-R_{it}^2}\right)$ ,  $R_{it}^2$  is estimated separately for each firm-year as described in section III.
- $TURN_{it}$  = The ratio of the average number of firm  $i$ 's shares traded in year  $t$  to firm  $i$ 's total common shares outstanding in year  $t$
- $\Delta$  = The annual change operator
- $\delta$  = The quarterly change operator


## Appendix B: Sample ETFs ranked by assets under management

This appendix provides a list of the 10 largest ETFs in our sample, ranked using the average assets under management (AUM). Each year we compute AUM as of the last trading day of the calendar year.

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Ticker</b>	<b>Fund name</b>	<b>Average AUM (in millions)</b>
1	SPY	SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF	\$86,971.45
2	IVV	iShares Core S&P 500 ETF	\$21,915.20
3	VTI	Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF	\$14,140.61
4	IWM	iShares Russell 2000 ETF	\$12,361.84
5	IWF	iShares Russell 1000 Growth Index ETF	\$10,312.08
6	IWD	iShares Russell 1000 Value Index ETF	\$8,965.49
7	DIA	SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF	\$8,428.39
8	IJH	iShares Core S&P Mid-Cap ETF	\$7,200.01
9	VOO	Vanguard S&P 500 ETF	\$6,838.45
10	MDY	Spdr S&P Midcap 400 ETF	\$6,783.54



**Figure 1: ETF ownership by year**

This chart plots, by fiscal year, the average percentage of shares outstanding held by ETFs for firms in our sample. The horizontal axis indicates the year and the vertical axis indicates the magnitude of ETF ownership. Our methodology for calculating ETF ownership is outlined in Section IV of the paper.



**Figure 2: Sample construction timeline**

**Panel A: Annual sample**



**Table 1: Sample Description****Panel A: Univariate statistics**

This panel presents univariate statistics for the key variables in our sample. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.

	N	MEAN	SD	Q1	Q2	Q3
ANALYST	29562	7.963	6.987	3	6	11
ATGROWTH	29970	22.835	59.931	-1.162	12.41	31.674
EARN	29970	-0.001	0.271	0.012	0.047	0.069
ETF	39863	3.306	2.972	1.223	2.52	4.707
INST	39863	57.775	31.256	30.833	62.497	85.46
LN(MVE)	39863	13.021	2.013	11.543	12.937	14.354
LOSS	29970	0.218	0.413	0	0	0
RET	29970	0.206	0.612	-0.14	0.113	0.401
ΔANALYST	29562	0.177	2.627	-1	0	1
ΔBETA	32536	0.036	0.418	-0.196	0.035	0.267
ΔBTM	39863	0.011	0.394	-0.117	0	0.123
ΔETF	39863	0.48	1.091	-0.001	0.277	0.879
ΔHLSREAD	39863	-0.022	0.445	-0.231	-0.042	0.137
ΔILLIQ_D	39863	1.741	15.661	-0.326	0.018	1.454
ΔILLIQ_N	39863	-0.083	0.801	-0.501	-0.118	0.238
ΔINST	39863	2.64	11.579	-2.583	1.09	6.163
ΔLN(MVE)	39863	0.054	0.501	-0.189	0.08	0.327
ΔSKEW	32536	-0.026	1.423	-0.627	-0.032	0.568
ΔSTD(RET)	39863	-1.794	30.486	-15.074	-1.876	11.24
ΔSYNCH	32536	0.053	1.896	-0.625	0.047	0.725
ΔTURN	39863	-0.065	5.437	-1.535	-0.018	1.438

**Panel B: Correlation matrix for level variables**

This panel presents correlation coefficients for the levels of key variables in our sample. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Pearson (Spearman) coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal.

	ETF	HLSREAD	ILLIQ_N	LN(MVE)	BTM	TURN	SYNCH
ETF	1.000	-0.141	-0.107	0.219	0.010	0.171	0.350
HLSREAD	-0.129	1.000	0.896	-0.451	0.158	0.136	-0.113
ILLIQ_N	-0.110	0.908	1.000	-0.374	0.163	0.244	-0.051
LN(MVE)	0.326	-0.501	-0.417	1.000	-0.276	0.185	0.524
BTM	-0.010	0.102	0.080	-0.370	1.000	-0.076	-0.106
TURN	0.403	0.143	0.232	0.389	-0.230	1.000	0.158
SYNCH	0.448	-0.106	-0.047	0.533	-0.056	0.240	1.000

**Panel C: Correlation matrix for change variables**

This panel presents correlation coefficients for the changes of key variables in our sample. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Pearson (Spearman) coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal.

	$\Delta\text{ETF}$	$\Delta\text{HLSREAD}$	$\Delta\text{ILLIQ\_N}$	$\Delta\text{LN(MVE)}$	$\Delta\text{BTM}$	$\Delta\text{TURNO}$	$\Delta\text{SYNCH}$
$\Delta\text{ETF}$	1.000	0.171	0.193	-0.005	0.022	0.070	0.080
$\Delta\text{HLSREAD}$	0.166	1.000	0.841	-0.102	0.138	0.118	0.142
$\Delta\text{ILLIQ\_N}$	0.177	0.790	1.000	-0.043	0.104	0.092	0.169
$\Delta\text{LN(MVE)}$	-0.016	-0.033	0.021	1.000	-0.722	0.096	0.148
$\Delta\text{BTM}$	0.026	0.043	-0.011	-0.792	1.000	-0.007	-0.114
$\Delta\text{TURNO}$	0.067	0.132	0.091	0.051	-0.004	1.000	0.083
$\Delta\text{SYNCH}$	0.112	0.245	0.285	0.164	-0.121	0.078	1.000

**Table 2: Regressions of bid-ask spread on ETF ownership**

This table presents regression summary statistics from the below regression of changes in bid-ask spread ( $\Delta HLSREAD$ ) on changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF$ ).  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

$$\Delta HLSREAD_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} + \beta_{ind} + \beta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

	Y = $\Delta HLSREAD_t$				
	Pred.	I		II	
$\Delta ETF_{t-1}$	+	0.016	**	0.017	**
		(2.41)		(2.51)	
$\Delta INST_{t-1}$				-0.0002	
				(-0.58)	
$\Delta LN(MVE)_{t-1}$		-0.044	*	-0.043	
		(-1.67)		(-1.64)	
$\Delta BTM_{t-1}$		0.051	**	0.051	**
		(2.42)		(2.43)	
$\Delta TURN_{t-1}$		0.000		0.001	
		(0.55)		(0.61)	
$\Delta STD(RET)_{t-1}$		0.001	*	0.001	*
		(1.86)		(1.85)	
Year FE		YES		YES	
Industry FE		YES		YES	
N		39863		39863	
Adj. R-Square		0.304		0.304	

**Table 3: Regressions of a measure of illiquidity (*ILLIQ\_N*) on ETF ownership**

This table presents regression summary statistics from the below regression of changes in daily average absolute returns ( $\Delta ILLIQ\_N$ ) on changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF$ ). *t*-statistics based on standard errors double clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

$$\Delta ILLIQ\_N_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \beta_3 \Delta ILLIQ\_D_{it} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} + \beta_{ind} + \beta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

	Y = $\Delta ILLIQ\_N_t$				
	Pred.	I		II	
$\Delta ETF_{t-1}$	+	0.042	**	0.043	**
		(2.55)		(2.57)	
$\Delta INST_{t-1}$				-0.0004	
				(-0.61)	
$\Delta LN(MVE)_{t-1}$		-0.015		-0.015	
		(-1.55)		(-1.55)	
$\Delta BTM_{t-1}$		0.172	***	0.171	***
		(4.20)		(4.25)	
$\Delta ILLIQ\_D_t$		0.004	***	0.004	***
		(5.38)		(5.44)	
Year FE		YES		YES	
Industry FE		YES		YES	
N		39863		39863	
Adj. R-Square		0.371		0.371	

**Table 4: Regressions of stock return synchronicity (*SYNCH*) on ETF ownership**

This table presents regression summary statistics from the below regressions of changes in stock return synchronicity ( $\Delta SYNCH$ ) on changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF$ ).  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

$$\Delta SYNCH_{it} = \beta_1 \Delta ETF_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta INST_{it-1} + \sum_k \beta_k \Delta Controls_{it-1} + \beta_{ind} + \beta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

Y = $\Delta SYNCH_t$					
	Pred.	I		II	
$\Delta ETF_{t-1}$	+	0.090	***	0.090	***
		(3.70)		(3.67)	
$\Delta INST_{t-1}$				0.0002	
				(0.21)	
$\Delta LN(MVE)_{t-1}$		0.595	***	0.593	***
		(8.78)		(9.82)	
$\Delta BTM_{t-1}$		-0.093		-0.094	*
		(-1.62)		(-1.70)	
$\Delta TURN_{t-1}$		0.001		0.001	
		(1.11)		(1.12)	
$\Delta SKEW_{t-1}$		0.004		0.004	
		(0.41)		(0.41)	
$\Delta BETA_{t-1}$		-0.704	***	-0.704	***
		(-14.85)		(-14.58)	
Year FE		YES		YES	
Industry FE		YES		YES	
N		32536		32536	
Adj. R-Square		0.086		0.086	

**Table 5: Regressions of current returns on future earnings and ETF ownership**

**Panel A: Total earnings**

This table presents regression summary statistics of regressions of current annual stock returns ( $RET_t$ ) on total future earnings ( $EARN_{t+1}$ ), the lagged level of ETF ownership ( $ETF_{t-1}$ ) and lagged changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF_{t-1}$ ).  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by year and firm are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

Y = RET <sub>t</sub>						
	Variable type	Pred	I		II	
EARN <sub>t-1</sub>	Main effect		-0.435 ***		-0.438 ***	
			(-6.90)		(-6.14)	
EARN	Main effect		0.282 ***		0.284 ***	
			(3.76)		(3.81)	
EARN <sub>t+1</sub>	Main effect		0.015 ***		0.015 ***	
			(4.80)		(4.32)	
ETF <sub>t-1</sub>	Main effect		-0.170			
			(-0.50)			
ΔETF <sub>t-1</sub>	Main effect				-0.768 **	
					(-2.06)	
ETF <sub>t-2</sub>	Main effect				0.070	
					(0.17)	
ETF <sub>t-1</sub> × EARN <sub>t-1</sub>	Interaction		0.594			
			(0.68)			
<b>ETF<sub>t-1</sub> × EARN<sub>t</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–	<b>-3.662 ***</b>			
			<b>(-2.60)</b>			
<b>ETF<sub>t-1</sub> × EARN<sub>t+1</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–	<b>-0.212 ***</b>			
			<b>(-4.64)</b>			
ΔETF <sub>t-1</sub> × EARN <sub>t-1</sub>	Interaction				0.194	
					(0.37)	
<b>ΔETF<sub>t-1</sub> × EARN<sub>t</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–			<b>-3.636 ***</b>	
					<b>(-2.68)</b>	
<b>ΔETF<sub>t-1</sub> × EARN<sub>t+1</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–			<b>-0.195 **</b>	
					<b>(-2.07)</b>	
ETF <sub>t-2</sub> × EARN <sub>t-1</sub>	Interaction				0.797	
					(0.64)	
<b>ETF<sub>t-2</sub> × EARN<sub>t</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–			<b>-3.739 **</b>	
					<b>(-2.23)</b>	
<b>ETF<sub>t-2</sub> × EARN<sub>t+1</sub></b>	<b>Interaction</b>	–			<b>-0.210 ***</b>	
					<b>(-4.48)</b>	

INST <sub>t-1</sub>	Control	-0.157 *** (-3.74)	-0.160 *** (-3.79)
LN(MVE) <sub>t-1</sub>	Control	0.011 * (1.87)	0.010 * (1.82)
LOSS <sub>t</sub>	Control	-0.213 *** (-8.61)	-0.212 *** (-8.61)
ATGROWTH <sub>t</sub>	Control	0.002 *** (9.73)	0.002 *** (9.76)
RET <sub>t+1</sub>	Control	-0.026 (-0.62)	-0.026 (-0.61)
Year FE		YES	YES
Industry FE		YES	YES
N		29970	29970
Adj R-Square		0.350	0.351

### Panel B: Earnings components

This table presents regression summary statistics of regressions of current annual stock returns ( $RET_t$ ) on future aggregate and firm-specific earnings ( $EARNAGG_{t+1}$  and  $EARNFIRM_{t+1}$ ), the lagged level of ETF ownership ( $ETF_{t-1}$ ) and lagged changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF_{t-1}$ ). Main effects variables include  $\Delta ETF_{t-1}$ ,  $ETF_{t-1}$ , and lagged, current, and future levels of  $EARNAGG$  and  $EARNFIRM$ . Control variables include  $INST_{t-1}$ ,  $LN(MVE)_{t-1}$ ,  $ATGROWTH_t$ ,  $LOSS_t$ , and  $RET_{t+1}$ .  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by year and firm are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

Y = RET <sub>t</sub>			
	Pred.	I	II
$\Delta ETF_t \times EARNAGG_t$	+	0.868 (0.69)	2.765 *** (4.25)
$\Delta ETF_t \times EARNFIRM_t$		0.888 (0.80)	2.921 *** (4.46)
-----			
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNAGG_{t-1}$			1.660 (1.40)
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNFIRM_{t-1}$			-0.577 (-0.66)
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNAGG_t$	-		-3.670 *** (-2.72)
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNFIRM_t$	-		-1.874 * (-1.67)
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNAGG_{t+1}$	-		-0.104 (-0.69)
$\Delta ETF_{t-1} \times EARNFIRM_{t+1}$	-		-0.172 *** (-3.26)
-----			
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNAGG_{t-1}$			2.708 (1.53)
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNFIRM_{t-1}$			0.286 (0.18)
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNAGG_t$	-		-6.387 *** (-6.19)
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNFIRM_t$	-		-4.255 *** (-4.16)
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNAGG_{t+1}$	-		-0.097 (-0.94)
$ETF_{t-2} \times EARNFIRM_{t+1}$	-		-0.136 ** (-2.02)
Year and industry FE		YES	YES
Main effects included		YES	YES
Controls included		YES	YES
N		29970	29970
Adj. R-Square		0.373	0.384

**Table 6: Replication and reconciliation of Glosten et al. (2016; GNZ) results**

This table presents summary statistics for regressions of quarter  $t$  returns on quarterly seasonally-adjusted earnings measures ( $earn$ ) and quarterly ETF ownership changes ( $etfchange$ ) from varying periods.  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by year and firm are shown in parentheses. Control variables include an intercept, a loss indicator ( $SLOSS_t$ ), lagged market-to-book ratio ( $MTB_{t-1}$ ), lagged standard deviation of earnings ( $STD_{t-1}$ ), lagged level of ETF ownership ( $ETF_{t-1}$ ), lagged firm size ( $LN(MVE)_{t-1}$ ), and the interaction of earnings with the loss indicator ( $earn \times SLOSS$ ). See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

		Y = Quarter $t$ returns							
		Varying ETF change period			Varying earnings period				
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
Alternative measures of $etfchange$	$\delta ETF_t$	5.344*** (6.535)							
	$\delta ETF_{t-1}$		0.083 (0.123)						
	$\delta ETF_{SUM\ t-1\ to\ t-4}$			-1.186* (-1.660)	-1.034 (-1.508)	-1.092 (-1.574)	-1.228* (-1.758)	-0.948 (-1.394)	
Alternative measures of $earn$	$SEARN_t$	0.488** (2.322)	0.564** (2.436)	0.730*** (2.926)					
	$SEARN_{t+1}$				1.449*** (2.885)				
	$SEARN_{t+2}$					1.504*** (3.337)			
	$SEARN_{t+3}$						1.081*** (2.947)		
	$SEARN_{SUM\ t\ to\ t+3}$							0.526*** (3.089)	
	$earn \times etfchange$	0.438** (2.458)	0.386* (1.729)	0.101 (0.767)	-0.418 (-1.494)	-0.376 (-1.466)	-0.568* (-1.809)	-0.198* (-1.848)	
	Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
	Obs	106953	101495	101495	101483	101483	101483	101483	
	Adj R-Square	0.0295	0.0282	0.0281	0.0407	0.0407	0.0193	0.0451	

**Table 7: Regressions of analyst coverage on ETF ownership**

This table presents summary statistics for regressions of changes in analyst coverage ( $\Delta ANALYST$ ) on changes in ETF ownership ( $\Delta ETF$ ).  $t$ -statistics based on standard errors double clustered by firm and year are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, based on a two-sided test.

$Y = \Delta ANALYST_t$	Pred.	I	II	III	IV
$\Delta ETF_{t-1}$	–	<b>0.042</b> <b>(1.24)</b>	<b>0.017</b> <b>(0.46)</b>	<b>0.029</b> <b>(0.87)</b>	<b>0.008</b> <b>(0.23)</b>
$ETF_{t-2}$	–			<b>-0.033</b> *** <b>(-4.52)</b>	<b>-0.025</b> *** <b>(-3.25)</b>
$\Delta INST_{t-1}$			0.013 *** (9.06)		0.012 *** (8.03)
$INST_{t-2}$					0.000 (-0.35)
$LN(MVE)_{t-1}$		0.056 (0.98)	0.060 (1.05)	0.065 (1.11)	0.066 (1.15)
$\Delta BTM_{t-1}$		-0.169 ** (-1.96)	-0.143 * (-1.72)	-0.171 ** (-1.97)	-0.146 * (-1.74)
$\Delta TURN_{t-1}$		0.014 *** (3.09)	0.008 * (1.94)	0.013 *** (2.95)	0.008 * (1.89)
$\Delta STD(RET)_{t-1}$		0.000 (0.20)	0.001 (1.17)	0.000 (0.36)	0.001 (1.25)
$\Delta INTAN\_F_{t-1}$		1.386 *** (3.77)	1.344 *** (3.66)	1.382 *** (3.75)	1.342 *** (3.64)
$\Delta RD\_F_{t-1}$		1.965 *** (2.79)	2.011 *** (2.85)	1.977 *** (2.81)	2.018 *** (2.86)
$MOM_{t-1}$		0.009 *** (7.68)	0.009 *** (7.44)	0.009 *** (7.70)	0.009 *** (7.48)
Year and industry FE		YES	YES	YES	YES
N		29562	29562	29562	29562
Adj. R-Square		0.038	0.041	0.039	0.042